Dystopian Paradox

I’m about a fourth of the way through Woodward’s new book. It’s a must read for those of us who want insight into the dysfunction of the Bush administration. It seems that every member of the Bush administration, our military leadership, and of course G. W. Bush himself, were out of touch with the reality of one or more aspects of the Iraq war and the mentality of various factions our troops were fighting.

Woodward says that Leon Panetta, a member of the Iraq Study Group, after interviewing Iraq leaders and CIA in Iraq, concluded that “Shias did the Shia thing, Sunnis did the Sunni thing and they all had militias to protect them. . . . many Iraqi leaders accepted violence as a legitimate and necessary tool of politics.” Evidently, the Bush administration and General Casey, who was replaced by Patreous, didn’t understand that.

The strategy of the Bush administration and our military leadership had an underlying assumption that the Iraqi people want peace. Maybe the ordinary Iraqi citizen does, but that is not the way of the Iraqi culture, where revenge and honor are so deeply ingrained.

It’s astonishing that members of the Bush administration were unable to project themselves into the mindset of their adversaries. SunTzu’s Art of War teaches that the military’s function is to preserve the state. War is all about politics. War is resorted to as a political tool only when diplomacy fails.

As it pertains to the Sunnis and Shias, they don’t folllow SunTzu’s teachings. Violence has been the prevailing legitimate blunt tool of the Sunni and Shia for centuries. We certainly didn’t follow his teachings in deciding to invade Iraq.

The surge has worked in terms of gaining more control over the violence in Iraq. However, it could be that the secret weapon, the existence but not the nature of which Woodward disclosed in 60 Minutes and Larry Kind interviews this week, may have much to do with the success of the surge. The Bush administration denies it, and asserts that the surge itself is the strategy that has changed things.

But the Bush administration has no credibility. The public position of Bush, Condi Rice and everybody else in the Bush administration this time two years ago was that their strategy was working when they knew it wasn’t. Fact is, it’s hard to tell if any of them knew what the strategy was or if there was one.

It appears that G.W. Bush’s primary agenda is protecting his legacy as a president. The reputation of any president is not worth the life of my son or grand child.

Bush has put Petraeus in a position that he thinks is fireproof. Bush believes neither McCain nor Obama as president will be able to fire Patreous, so that we will succeed in whatever our goal is, and Bush will be vindicated.

I don’t see that as an absolute if Obama as president thinks through what we ordinary citizens will in reality win or lose by staying in Iraq. In doing a balance sheet on staying, what we gain is an asset and what we lose is a liability. Will we be in the black or the red?

A proper evaluation of each asset must include the validity of its underlying assumptions. For example, and underlying assumption is that if we don’t stay, then we will be fighting terrorists here in the United States. An asset of staying is therefore national security. But is the underlying assumption valid? Might we be fighting terrorists here anyway?

Another is that if we don’t stay, we will be cut-off from affordable oil. An asset is our way of life continues. However, if we stay does that mean we will have affordable oil in the foreseeable future that will sustain our present way of life? Many think not.

The War Within sets out a great case study on strategic thinking and the lack thereof. I hope to finish reading the book this weekend.

You can get this book for $17.60 plus shipping at I Think Therefore I Am a Bookstore.

Ridge Dickey